Silence hit my head
The most massive protests in the history of Kazakhstan, after which pogroms began in a number of cities of the republic (the authorities call them a «terrorist attack from the outside»), were remembered by the townspeople, among other things, by the total shutdown of the Internet, and in several regions — and communications. This was partly justified by the introduction of a state of emergency, in which communications can be blocked at the discretion of the city's military commanders. However, the technology of turning off the Internet even in these conditions raised questions. In addition to blocking the mobile Internet, which other states also faced — Russia in Moscow and Ingushetia during the protests, Belarus during the 2020 revolution — in Kazakhstan, the entire wired Internet was also turned off: a single provider, Kazakhtelecom, simply pressed the switch and turned it on. at strictly defined hours. The official explanation was that blocking the networks was needed so that the bandits who attacked Kazakhstan could not coordinate their actions with each other. But this does not explain the more or less stable work of the Internet in the country in the morning (apparently, at this time, the «militants» should sleep) and sometimes in the evenings. Although there is still some explanation: such inconsistencies are part of the functioning of the “sovereign Kaznet” system (by analogy with the same system in Russia). A system that turned out to be not very viable.
At this point, one should recall several technological innovations that were introduced in Kazakhstan to facilitate their work by the special services (Novaya wrote about this):
- < li> introduction of the SORM system to control communication and Internet traffic in the country;
- the obligation to register not only telephone numbers, but also telephone sets (as a result, in particular, it was impossible to rearrange a SIM card from one mobile phone to another);
- an attempt to install a mandatory Internet security certificate throughout the country, which, in fact, turned out to be a spy program that allows you to perluster almost all of the user's traffic (the attempt failed, although because of this it is still impossible to access some Kazakhstani sites from Russia);
- in addition, by law, all Kazakhstani sites were declared mass media, and their hosting had to be on the territory of the republic. This means that if the Internet is disconnected, their functioning will cease for everyone.
In other words, the Internet in Kazakhstan is completely regulated and is under the control of the authorities. In addition, according to Mikhail Klimarev, director of the non-profit organization «Society for the Protection of the Internet», a traffic filtering system partially operates in the republic — the same DPI, which is the basis of «sovereign Runet». In this case — «sovereign Kaznet».
All these restrictions were supported not only by the full de facto freedom of the special services in terms of intrusion into the Internet life of citizens, but also by law. According to the 9th article of the Law «On Communications», in Kazakhstan, for «the organization and technical support of Internet traffic exchange points for long-distance and international communication operators on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan, as well as joining the networks of long-distance and international communication operators to the Internet traffic exchange point» a monopoly is established. And this, in fact, can only be done by the state provider Kazakhtelecom, in which until recently the eldest daughter of Nursultan Nazarbayev Dariga, one of the businessmen close to the first president Bulat Utemuratov, and also the grandson of Nurali had influence.
Thus, the entire system was initially set up to ensure filtering of information in emergency conditions, as well as to find and neutralize any user, be it a politically objectionable figure or a terrorist (even if he is international, but he will still have to register a telephone in Kazakhstan, otherwise he will not be able to talk). In practice, says Klimarev, none of this worked. None of the warning, search and control systems were able to prevent the attack — largely because in fact it was designed to suppress dissent, and not to counter the bandits. And the security officials had no choice but to take extreme measures. “We recorded similar shutdowns, for example, in Iraq in 2019 and last year in Uganda,” says Klimarev. «In the most critical moments, the authorities simply spit on things that are critical for the country's life and turn off the entire Internet.»
Why, in the end, it was necessary to disconnect the wired Internet, and not just the mobile one, no one understands: the explanation that the coordination of «terrorists» among themselves is thus disrupted does not stand up to criticism, the expert believes. “What are they, over the wired Internet or through messengers, discussing everything with each other? — Klimarev grins. — At the same time, voice communication is not disconnected everywhere. Don't you think this is some kind of contradiction? » The IT specialist believes that in this case, a long-standing reflex of any authoritarian government worked: in any incomprehensible situation, turn off the Internet completely. But this leads to exactly the opposite results.
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“You deprive people of access to information, and the first thing they do, go out into the street or to their friends, is to find out what is happening.
Any system shutdown only aggravates situation «, — Klimarev is categorical.
As if coming to his senses, on January 11, the authorities of Kazakhstan turned on the Internet throughout the country for the whole day — but at night they announced a possible shutdown of it — as part of the curfew of the state of emergency, which will last until 19 January.