Multi-part geopolitical thriller continues. The Spaniards, contrary to American wishes, «let slip» the world with the US and NATO's responses to Russia's proposals (many prefer to call them an ultimatum) on security issues. The main demands of the Russian side (to legally consolidate the principle of non-expansion of NATO to the east and non-deployment of NATO strike weapons near the borders of the Russian Federation, to return to the bloc's infrastructure before 1997) were quite expectedly rejected. However, a number of Western proposals, classified by Russian officials and their expert propaganda staff as “secondary” (although quite recently they were offered by the Russian side), are of undoubted interest. Of course, if you seriously want a real easing of tension and strengthening of European and world security. True, then we will have to consider proposals separately and negotiate on various tracks, and not insist on unconditional observance of the «indivisibility of the package.»
We are talking about the prospects and pitfalls of the Western response to Russian proposals with the leading Russian specialist in security and disarmament issues, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Alexei Arbatov. =»SingleImage_image__3qIDn» alt=»» />
Alexey Arbatov. Photo: Ramil Sitdikov/RIA Novosti
— I understand that it’s impossible to get into our leaders’ heads, but why do you think Moscow formulated these three “main” demands, which are obviously unacceptable for the Western side?
One guess might be the following. After the arrival of Biden, everything somehow went very smoothly with Russia: the extension of the START-3 Treaty, the summit in Geneva, the start of negotiations on strategic stability, and the objections to Nord Stream 2 were lifted. At the same time, the United States turned even more attention to China, to military, economic and political threats from its side. And Russia somehow began to be forgotten, pushed to the periphery of international attention. Meanwhile, the processes are unfavorable. Ukraine has lost part of its territory, as has Georgia, but their drift towards NATO continues, cooperation is growing, the impasse over the Minsk agreements is deepening, and the link with the brotherly country is weakening. Perhaps it was decided to disturb this superficially benign atmosphere. President Putin said at a meeting with the Foreign Ministry a little earlier: our actions are causing tension in the West, and we must support it, implying that otherwise we will not be able to resolve issues that are serious for us.
— But why is the West being challenged right now?
This has puzzled many at home and abroad. After all, Trump caused us much more trouble: he first delivered strike anti-tank weapons to Ukraine, denounced the INF Treaty, tried to block Nord Stream 2, put pressure on NATO to increase military budgets, expanded the nuclear arms race and the missile defense program, openly sabotaged the extension of START -3. But Trump seemed belligerent, ignorant and impulsive, could «break the chain.»
And Biden is sluggish, sensible and liberal. Moreover, he made an insulting personal attack against Putin, which is unforgivable in big politics.
And he himself has an inglorious withdrawal from Afghanistan, fear of China's missile buildup and a deep domestic political crisis. It is possible that Moscow drew conclusions from all this, although such motives and goals are our great secret, and they can be completely different …
Vladimir Putin and Joe Biden. Photo: Getty Images
— If the “main” cases for the Kremlin related to the non-expansion of NATO to the East are expectedly rejected by the West, then for Russia there is still something positive in the US responses and NATO? What is the value to our security of discussing and resolving so-called secondary issues?
— Militarily, of course, there is. If we talk objectively about the interests of Russia's military security, then there is a whole package of initiatives that Russia has put forward over the past years and which were simply rejected out of hand: they say, after Crimea and Donbass, there will be no serious talks with Russia.
Now, without linking with Crimea and Donbass, much of that has been accepted for negotiations. Take, for example, an agreement to discuss the non-deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe — both on Russian territory and to the west of it, as well as inspections at missile defense bases in Poland and Romania, and in exchange — at the bases of our operational-tactical Iskander missiles. . This in itself is a very important step along the key link between strategic stability and European security. After all, the initiative was put forward personally by Putin back in October 2019, two and a half years ago.
— That is, despite the refusal of the West to discuss guarantees of further non-expansion of NATO to the East, is there still some bonus for Russia?
— Yes, and the bonus is really big. Because an agreement on non-expansion of NATO to the east, even if one imagines signing such an agreement (although legally it is very difficult to do), it will be just a piece of paper. Our draft agreement with NATO says that with a 30-day notice, any state can withdraw from this agreement. (By the way, for some reason, there is no such article in the document for the United States.) As for the agreement on medium-range missiles, on the non-deployment of NATO regular combat troops in Ukraine, on the limitation and transparency of maneuvers and other significant measures that they agreed to discuss, then we need years and years to practically skip such arrangements. For two and a half years there has been no INF treaty, and there are still no medium-range missiles — neither ours nor Americans — in Europe, and in Asia the United States is still just planning them.
Another example: exactly 20 years since there has been no ABM treaty. And what did the Americans do during this time? Deployed 44 strategic interceptors in Alaska and Northern California. And under the contract it was possible to have them up to 100 units. On ships and placed in Romania, in Poland the base is still being built. But these are theater interceptors — against medium-range missiles. They do not threaten us in any way as long as we do not have medium-range missiles. But, of course, it’s very bad that they broke that treaty, caused a whole package of our retaliatory weapons systems, to which the United States is preparing its own military-technical response.
Of course, in real politics there are no unshakable agreements, but material the military-technical side of disarmament agreements is much more tangible and much less reversible than political declarative agreements with an obligation not to do something. (Recall the Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of bad memory.)
Launcher deployment during the Iskander-M missile system special exercise. Photo: Konstantin Morozov/RIA Novosti
— Maybe putting forward such maximalist demands on the Western side is just a tactic? Ask for more so that there is somewhere to go when “trading”? And finally get something that was not possible before?
I don't think it's just a tactic. I think these three points are very important for the Putin government: to reverse the processes that he found when he came to power in 2000. First of all, it is the eastward expansion of NATO, which, as we have been warning them for many years, will bring Europe to the brink of war. For Moscow, Ukraine's membership in the alliance is absolutely unacceptable. To use Fouche's classic «realpolitik» formula (which is attributed to Talleyrand), the said policy of the West is «worse than a crime, this is a mistake», and on a historical scale. But how to get out of this disastrous rut is another question. It looks like it hasn't been worked out properly yet. Even if you look at the two Russian documents presented by the US and NATO, they largely duplicate each other, but in some ways they simply do not fit.
— Apparently, there was a need for some kind of “strong words,” which, in the opinion of those who express them, make the opponent think and then incline to further discussions. Can this be assumed?
Everything can be guessed. I can only say that over the past seven years, after the events in Ukraine in 2014, none of what we have proposed has been adopted: neither on incident prevention, nor on missiles, nor on missile defense, nothing. And here Russia is conducting a powerful show of force on land and at sea, plus the December diplomatic demarche… You can look for fleas in these two documents, but the demarche is something offensive, and in a very ultimatum form.
Did it work? Produced. Previously, they did not want to talk, but now they said: okay, let's go.
— In general, this has a bad side, it pushes you to organize demonstration performances on every important issue, to put pressure on it, and this in itself, it seems to me, is dangerous and does not improve the atmosphere.
— Well, if it’s uncomfortable in a good atmosphere, then it will be bad. And this is not the first time. The spring maneuvers after Biden's offensive words were powerful, with landings, etc. And what followed? Phone call from the White House, summit meeting, launch of strategic stability talks. And now for the second time on an even larger scale. What followed? We have already talked about this: even if not everyone accepted, but they went for something important. So as long as it works. Unless, of course, it turns into a real war, which will be a disaster for everyone. According to this story, they themselves are to blame in the West: while they were persuaded in words, they were not taken seriously, but as they showed an armored fist, they agreed to negotiations.
US base in Romania. Photo: US Navy
— Now let's go over some points that may be promising. First of all, what I don't quite understand. What does the readiness of the Western side to fix the mechanisms for resolving concerns on paper mean?
— What can be meant by mechanisms? Well, there is the Center for the Prevention of Nuclear Threat, it sorts out any misunderstandings related to the launch of missiles, with some kind of nuclear events. Some additional permanent centers may be set up, for example, to prevent incidents in the air and at sea during regular bomber flights near each other's airspace and during warships' cruises to foreign shores. And even better, such actions are strictly limited, why constantly play on each other's nerves?
— What about the declared discussion about the principle of indivisibility of security? It can continue indefinitely: each side will defend its own understanding of this security, and how can this be agreed upon? It's not about specific weapons and specific actions?
— Security has no substantive definition. It consists of a set of all sorts of rhetorical provisions, it cannot be calculated and determined: there is equality or not. The indivisibility of security is, rather, a theoretical position that each side operates on the basis of its subjective ideas about the world around.
But what is important: at the last press conference after the meeting with Orban, President Putin said in passing, but it is very important that the indivisibility of security applies not only to Russia, but also to Ukraine and European countries. A lot stems from this. For example, if there is some form of obligation not to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, then there should be reciprocal obligations to guarantee the security of these states as well.