In the second round of elections, the opposition may poach voters abroad
As Turkey recovers from a hot Sunday election day and mentally prepares for the upcoming runoff in two weeks, analysts are still trying analyze the available results and predict how the second series of the presidential race will unfold. In particular, experts are interested in how representatives of the Turkish diaspora vote in different parts of the world. Thus, ethnic Turks in the countries of Western Europe have traditionally voted for the incumbent President Erdogan. But diasporas from Eastern Europe, the United States, as well as Russia and China, preferred to see opposition leader Kemal Kılıçdaroglu as head of the Republic of Turkey. Let's figure out what this may be connected with.
If for Turkish citizens living on the territory of their country, the election day was May 14, then for Turkish diasporas abroad, everything came much earlier. Representatives of diasporas could vote for their candidate from April 27 to May 9. According to data released by the Turkish Central Election Commission on Monday, more than half of the citizens living outside the republic supported the incumbent head of state, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In total, the result was a decent 55.36%.
The single opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroglu was also voted for, but it turned out to be much less — 41.26%. ATA Alliance candidate Sinan Ogan earned 2.20% of the vote. Remarkably and importantly, the turnout in the Turkish presidential elections abroad was 50.55%, which indicates the genuine interest of absolutely all Turks (regardless of their place of residence) in the fate of their country.
But here it is not even the percentage distribution that is curious, but the geographical component. Thus, Erdogan received the strong support of the majority of Turks in Germany (the largest Turkish diaspora of 3 million people lives in this country), France, Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, Serbia and a number of other European states. The current head of state was in the lead in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, as well as most of the Middle East and North African countries.
At the same time, diasporas in the UK, Italy, Spain, Greece, as well as many Eastern European countries preferred Erdogan's rival, Kılıçdaroğlu. Along with the United States (which was quite expected), Japan, Georgia and Kazakhstan, representatives of the Turkish community in Russia and China also appeared on the list of «fans» of the oppositionist.
In order to analyze the reasons for such a curious alignment, we need to go a little deeper into the context and explain that, in general, the Turkish diaspora has long been a stronghold of Erdogan's support. As the American magazine Foreign Policy recalled on the eve of the Turkish elections, in the last general election, support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from abroad even surpassed support for the party at home. At that time, representatives of the western part of Europe expressed their sympathies especially actively.
As the publication emphasized, the success of the AKP in these communities, apparently, was associated with such factors as socio-economic disadvantages and political isolation, combined with the identification with Sunni Islam.
For years, the AKP has done everything possible to maintain its competitive edge among the Turkish diaspora. Since the 2010s, his outreach strategy has changed, with the Erdoğan government allocating significant public resources to expand its influence in diaspora communities. Among other things, the creation of a state agency (Department for Turks Abroad and Kindred Communities under the Government of Turkey) linked directly to the office of the President has allowed the AKP to selectively work with the «devout and nationalist members» of the diaspora, tailoring educational and cultural programs specifically for these groups.
By 2018, the state organization Union of International Democrats had established more than 253 local offices around the world tasked with coordinating efforts by the Turkish regime to consolidate voters abroad.
But the opposition did not lag behind. For example, the Republican People's Party (CHP) over the past decade has developed a tight network of 41 local representations around the world, whose membership has steadily grown. To further coordinate CHP activities abroad, the party also recently appointed a representative in parliament to deal with transnational issues.
Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which is considered «pro-Kurdish» in Turkey and has been accused of supporting opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu , also expanded its influence on the Turkish diaspora in Europe. Building on pre-existing Kurdish and left-wing networks, the HDP managed to achieve good results in the 2018 elections in countries such as Sweden, Switzerland and the UK.
But still, Sunday's elections clearly showed that Erdogan still continues to enjoy greater popularity among foreign diasporas. However, as everyone already understood, not everyone. The public was especially surprised that Turkish citizens in Russia in most cases preferred Kılıçdaroğlu. In the minds of Russian society, this politician is associated with an unequivocally pro-Western course, and recently the figure of this candidate has begun to bring up memories of the phrase he carelessly threw about “Russian interference in the Turkish elections.” So after all, what could be the reason for such a choice, which, at times, seems completely unexpected?
– So it turns out that people traditionally live in Russia who are closer to, let's say, leftist views. Therefore, they do not share Erdogan's ideology, his values. This is the reason, — commented the editor of «MK-Turkey» Yashar Niyazbaev. — A very large number of representatives of the Turkish diaspora live in Germany, who are nostalgic for the country. They usually follow what is happening in their homeland as a result of foreign policy, or through pro-government TV channels. And in general, I repeat, they are driven by nostalgia, they evaluate things differently. They don't face the problems that caused slightly fewer people to vote for the incumbent this time around, namely economic problems.
— I don't think that's the point. Here the matter is in relation to one's state from the outside. If someone in Turkey does not vote for Erdogan, then this is primarily due to economic or ideological problems. The most important thing now for a person who votes in Turkey is the economy. You have to live in this country to feel such moments. If you look from the outside, then the weight of the state in the eyes of the whole world is already estimated, and so on. Interested in completely different questions.
— No, not like in the first round. There is 5% of Sinan Ogan who will not participate. It turns out that these 5% will somehow have to be divided. Most likely, Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan will have to make sure that more people abroad go to vote. This will also have weight, since they will make up about another 2%. The turnout abroad, as we saw, was about 50%, which means that another 50% could vote. And it is not known who they would vote for. Plus, the nationalist electorate that voted for Ogan will need to be somehow won over to their side.
It will be difficult for everyone, everyone will have to come up with new decisions to make. Although it seems to me that the opposition responded more to the issues of combating migration with that part of the population that voted for Sinan Ogan. He was a nominee of the anti-immigrant party. And here there is a chance that Kılıçdaroğlu may be a more attractive candidate, because he promised to solve this problem in two years. But Erdogan was more gentle on this issue. Now he will either have to toughen up this rhetoric or offer something else.