Unreasonable fuel economy puts aviators in a difficult position
The emergency landing of the Ural Airlines Airbus A320 in a wheat field near Novosibirsk was associated not so much with a failure of the aircraft’s hydraulic system, but with completely different reasons . They, according to experts, are capable, unfortunately, of debunking the image of heroic pilots who landed the plane outside the airfield in an extreme manner to save passengers. Expert conclusions based on the latest data obtained are presented by MK.
Photo: RF Ministry of Emergency Situations
In an exclusive interview with MK, the captain of the Airbus A320 crew, Sergei Belov, said that after it became known about the failure of the hydraulic system, he decided to land the plane en route to Omsk in Novosibirsk, since the weather conditions at the Omsk airport were allegedly not too suitable for this good. According to the pilot, there was a strong wind.
However, Belov continued, after this events began to develop rapidly — before landing, the fuel suddenly began to suddenly run out, with approximately 210 kg remaining. The crew decided that they might not have enough fuel to reach Novosibirsk and decided to land somewhere on a flat surface. We chose a wheat field. None of the 159 passengers on board, including 23 children and 6 crew members, were injured, with the exception of a few who received minor bruises during the hard landing.
As for the official data from the air services, they report the following about the incident: on September 12 at 04:43 Moscow time, “during landing, on straight runway 07, the PIC (aircraft commander -) reported a loss of hydraulics and decided to proceed to an alternate airfield Novosibirsk (Tolmachevo). Meteorological conditions: wind 8 m/s, visibility more than 10 km, low cloud level (lower cloud horizon — ) — 1200, temperature +9, KSc 0.6.»
However, already at 05:23 the PIC announced the signal «DISTRESS «, emergency fuel remaining for 46 minutes, fuel is running out in the area of the settlement. Kargath is preparing to land on a site picked up from the air.»
In the published negotiations between the pilots, after information about the failure of the hydraulic system and the subsequent clarification of the approach to the Novosibirsk Tolmachevo airfield, there is also a phrase from the crew: “We don’t have enough fuel.”
At the request of “MK”, having studied all currently available data about the flight, emergency landing, weather conditions and crew actions, an experienced aviation specialist — a pilot with 40 years of experience, who has mastered more than one type of aircraft, the ex-commander of the Il-96 and Superjet-100, Vladimir Salnikov, expressed the following opinion:
— After some details and details became known, I have many questions for the ship’s commander. Let's start with the fact that, judging by the negotiations, the way he stated about the hydraulic failure was an incorrect report. Actually, this aircraft has three such hydraulic systems — two main and one reserve. He had to report as expected: which one failed. He did not do this.
— Depending on what kind of hydraulic system it is, landing restrictions are imposed.
For example, the spoilers may not deploy, otherwise the spoilers may not deploy, or the nose landing gear will not be controlled normally — in this case, the plane may taxi off the runway on its own, which means that the main landing gear will need to be braked separately. These are all the minimum restrictions that, depending on the specific failure, will apply when landing the aircraft.
— Judging by the weather data provided, it was almost perfect! As we pilots say: a million per million, without restrictions. Simply a side wind of 8 meters per second. True, its direction is not indicated, but in any case, such a wind allows you to land even with a partially failed hydraulic system.
— About fuel is a completely separate conversation. Evidence is given that the crew gave an emergency signal when there was 46 minutes of fuel left in the flight. And to Novosibirsk there were about 200 km to fly, that is, 15-20 minutes, and the field where he landed was about 180 km from it.
Moreover, if you declared an SOS, then the airfield services will take you to the landing along the shortest route. And the fuel reserve for 46 minutes would be quite enough for this.
For example: if the plane is at an altitude of 10 km, you set the throttle to low, it will still fly about 180-200 km on it, slowly descending. Well, then, if they start it in a straight line, this will add another 5 minutes for the landing approach. So everything is fine — there would be enough fuel.
Why did he make such a decision — to land in a field with such fuel remaining? This is difficult to understand.
— Here again I have big questions about crew training. I think they did not have enough experience to understand the following: when the plane is parallel to the ground, then this is one indicator of fuel. When it takes off, the fuel in the tanks is, accordingly, poured into the back of the tank — these are the forces of physics, you can’t escape them. When descending, all the fuel in the tank moves forward. And here a lot depends on where the sensors that measure fuel are located. You need to focus on this.
Here you are flying in horizontal flight, and before descending, before setting the throttle to idle — I’ve done this all my life — you look at what fuel level your fuel gauge shows. There, fuel is measured in kilograms.
After you set the plane to descend, this figure changes immediately by an order of magnitude, since the fuel is poured into the front part of the fuel tanks. At this moment, the fuel measurement will no longer be correct.
The correct measurement was while you were on the flight level, without descending and without raising your nose. When lowering, you must take these details into account. In this case, it seems that the commander did not take them into account. After all, it was initially said that there was fuel for 46 minutes of flight, but when he switched the plane to a descent, suddenly the fuel gauge showed that there was 210 km left.
— It's just panic. Although, I must admit, the panic is controlled. The commander did a great job of pulling himself together and finding a field to sit down. And he did it successfully too. Although I consider his previous actions to be absolutely ignorant.
— I don’t remember now how long the runway in Omsk is, but when there are restrictions on landing due to a partial failure of the hydraulic system, in this case the commander must perform the landing himself.
Then — and this is written in the manual of any type of aircraft — if in pre-landing mode the spoilers or spoilers on the wing that reduce the lift are not released — pilots also call them “air brakes”, then you turn on the engine reverse. And on this Airbus A320 it was working. With its help, active braking is carried out, which is used until the aircraft comes to a complete stop.
The ship's commander has the right to do this. The only problem here is that later, when the plane is on the apron, each of its engines will have to be very carefully inspected by ground services for damage. The fact is that the reverse lifts all the debris from the runway, and pebbles can damage the turbine blades.
— Yes. The commander had to land in Omsk, and not even go anywhere, to any airport in Novosibirsk. He had all the conditions for this. The “heroic landing” in the field was unnecessary and unjustified. Thank God that everything ended well. It could have been much worse…
However, another flight specialist believes that the crew’s concerns about the lack of fuel in the face of a hydraulic system failure were still somewhat justified. These reasons, in a difficult situation where the crew was under stress, could put unnecessary psychological pressure on the pilots.
Here is what this aviation specialist, who has worked for many years in the industry, said on condition of anonymity:
— The pilots decided to land in the field when they considered that they did not have enough fuel to reach the alternate airfield. It is clear that they were afraid that they would run out of fuel while they were looking for a runway in Novosibirsk.
— And this is already a question… It used to be like this: I make a decision to fly out. I have regulatory documents that say that I must have enough fuel for the entire flight to the main landing airfield. Plus, if the weather conditions there are at their limit, and suddenly the airport “slams shut” due to the weather, then I should still have fuel to get to the alternate airfield and land there. And legally I must have three attempts to land. That is, the remaining fuel should remain for another 30 minutes of flight. This expense was previously determined by documents.
— Now, they say, many of these documents have already been changed. Pilots say that crews are often required to take fuel by order of airline management, taking into account the concept of a “return point.” That is, roughly speaking, when there are 250-300 km left to the destination airfield, the pilot at that moment should already know the weather at both the main airfield and the alternate one.
If it is good both there and there, the crew, of course, decides to go to the main one. But if suddenly, on approach to it, it becomes known that, say, trucks collided on the runway or another plane did not have time to clear the runway, then the pilot no longer has the opportunity to gain altitude from the circle and fly to the alternate airfield.
In this case, with the Airbus A320, the alternate airfield was Novosibirsk, to which, as the pilots considered, they might not have enough fuel.
— In this case, he must make circles, flying over the destination airfield, until the obstacle that prevents landing is removed. Well, or, as it was now, look for a flat area near the airfield and land.
— Yes. And this is a violation of all air laws. This is now happening everywhere, in all airlines, in order to save fuel, in order to refuel as little as possible during flights.
Previously, when I was still working, I had a clear legal justification based on the Air Code: a final decision Only the ship's commander is responsible for refueling the aircraft. No one had the right to interfere with this decision with any other orders or instructions to the commander.
— And now, according to the pilots, the airline management is violating this rule. A number of bosses simply give instructions: if you again fill more fuel than necessary, you will fly with me on the worst flights. Or even worse: they will be reprimanded or deprived of payments.
That is, there is often direct pressure on aircraft commanders. And all this, of course, can affect what decision the ship’s commander will make at a difficult moment.