The Yerevan Prime Minister demonstrates pragmatism — and a desperate desire to survive
Dear ones scold — they are just amusing themselves. This is definitely not about Russia and Armenia. The resentment of the two sides against each other is real (especially in the case of Yerevan). Darlings scold, but at the same time do not cross the line, followed by a final and irrevocable break — this is much closer to the truth. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced the future fate of the Russian military base in his country: “The reasons for the presence of the Russian base and border guards are clear. These grounds continue to exist.»
The words of a true pragmatist and realist, and also a politician, ready for any cunning political maneuvers in order to remain in power.
Despite all the warnings from Moscow, Armenia has ratified the Rome Statute — a document that obliges it, in accordance with a warrant from the International Criminal Court in The Hague, to arrest Vladimir Putin if the Russian President suddenly appears on its territory.
Yerevan is loudly signaling its readiness to leave the CSTO, a defense bloc patronized by Moscow. Pashinyan constantly expresses himself in the spirit that the “allies of Armenia” (read – Russia) turned out to be not really allies. And suddenly such a turn — although the allies are not really allies, Yerevan still needs their military base.
In fact, there is no turning point. There is a well-calculated course in which negative rhetoric towards Moscow is organically (at least from Pashinyan’s point of view) combined with the preservation of the fundamental foundations of cooperation between the two countries.
There is an expression: one should not confuse God’s gift with scrambled eggs In relation to today's relations between Russia and Armenia, the same idea sounds like this: do not confuse symbolism with content.
The presence of Armenia in the CSTO is, first of all, symbolism. Yerevan did not and does not expect military assistance from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. For Armenia, bilateral military relations with Russia are primary. And if so, then if it is necessary to loudly bang your fist on the table — they say, we are dissatisfied with Moscow — but at the same time keep everything as it is, then membership in the CSTO is the element that can be sacrificed.
The same applies to the Rome Statute and even Yerevan’s demonstrative political tricks with the West. Today Putin has no need to visit Armenia. But if such a need arises in a conditional tomorrow or the day after tomorrow, guarantees of its inviolability will certainly appear.
“The law is what the drawbar is: where you turn, that’s where it comes out” — this also applies to the Rome Statute. As for Pashinyan’s flirtations with the United States and the EU, the prime minister well understands the significance of geography: Armenia is sandwiched between its “friends” such as Azerbaijan and Turkey. Yerevan’s natural allies in such conditions are Russia and Iran. And no matter how much Pashinyan personally wants to “go to the West,” objective geopolitical circumstances prevent this. The West is far away, but all other partners of Armenia (both in a negative and a positive sense) are close.
Currently in Yerevan there is a painful process of changing political eras. The Karabakh phase of Armenian politics, which lasted several decades, is ending. A new phase begins — promising some prospects, but at the same time no less dangerous.
Having completed its project for the return of Karabakh, Azerbaijan is ready to move on — to create a “transport corridor” through Armenia to its autonomous region of Nakhichevan. If we compare what is happening in the region now with what happened in the late 80s, we can state: Yerevan and Baku have changed roles.
Previously, Armenia successfully attacked, while Azerbaijan defended unsuccessfully. But now Azerbaijan is ready to attack and demand a new, even more beneficial regional redistribution for it. The task of Yerevan is to ensure the inviolability of those borders in which the Armenian SSR existed.
And this is where Russia and its military base become very necessary. Of course, this military base is just one element of Yerevan’s political defense system. From the point of view of international law, Karabakh has always remained the territory of Azerbaijan. Even Armenia itself has never recognized the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. Of course, such a position was just a legal fiction. But this fiction very well illustrates the difference between the task that Azerbaijan has already solved and the task that it has yet to solve.
If Baku tries to take away part of the territory of the former Armenian SSR from Yerevan by armed means, then, with from the point of view of international law, he will commit an act of aggression. And this may well be followed by international sanctions and other troubles that Azerbaijan does not need at all.
It turns out that, having surrendered Karabakh, Pashinyan retreated to lines that are much easier to defend politically. But for such a defense to be successful, Yerevan will need all available resources: political support from the West and political (and, if necessary, military) support from Russia and Iran. Otherwise, Armenia is left alone with Turkey and Azerbaijan — countries historically hostile to it, which even now are not averse to eating it up.
But if there is such support, then the situation changes radically. Baku has powerful incentives to peacefully and compromise resolve all its disagreements with Yerevan. Ideally, such a compromise would mean for Armenia maintaining sovereignty over its entire territory, including the proposed “transit corridors” and ending the economic blockade in which it has been “thanks to” Azerbaijan and Turkey for many decades.
This is exactly the result. , it seems, is what Nikol Pashinyan is trying to achieve — a politician who clearly does not understand well and does not really like Russia, but who is at the same time aware of geopolitical realities, knows how to maneuver and really wants to survive.