The General Staff of the Malian Armed Forces promised to learn lessons
The ambush and shooting of a convoy of a unit of the Malian government forces and the 13th assault detachment of the Wagner PMC near the Tin-Gamira mountains still raises many questions. The situation that developed near Tin-Gamira and the video of the shooting of the PMC fighters that was distributed on the Internet were commented on by MK by the former head of the operational management department of the headquarters of the Joint Group of Troops (Forces) of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia in the Chechen Republic, retired Colonel Igor Nikolaev (last name changed). He called the ambush strange and the video of the shooting more like a staged event.
These are the questions that arise when analyzing the ambush in Mali. How could the Islamists of the Coordination Movement of Azawad and the terrorist group Al-Qaeda in the Sahel, banned in Russia, have learned the route of the alleged retreat of the Wagnerites from the Malian border with Algeria near the city of Tin Zaouatine? Where did the militants get foreign heavy weapons, drones, and suicide vehicles, as well as reinforcements, during a sandstorm, which resulted in an almost ninefold superiority in manpower? How did the Tuaregs manage to lure the remnants of government troops and the Russian detachment into a trap?
— In my opinion, this is a very strange ambush of Malian rebels after a sandstorm, — says the interlocutor of «MK». — «Wagnerites» were simply shot at point-blank with small arms with a low fire density. From the opposite side, we do not hear that ours are firing back. Many questions arise about combat security on the march, the formation of the column and the distance between vehicles, reconnaissance, air cover, the actions of the lateral marching outposts. It seems that these are not the «Wagnerites» who have combat experience. They were shot like people sentenced to death, gathered in a heap.
— Unfounded statements about betrayal can sow distrust in the government of Mali. Therefore, I would not rush to such a conclusion. Moreover, there could have been another reason for the losses in the 13th assault detachment — lack of discipline and the withdrawal of officials from participation in organizing the security at the halt. Judging by the video recording, this is probable, at least, it cannot be ruled out.
– The Tuaregs, of course, have a lot of combat experience, which they acquired in Libya during the time of Muammar Gaddafi, but even taking this experience into account, they are far inferior to the Wagnerites in combat training and weapons. The video shows some kind of staging of an ambush, but not the ambush itself.
– Because an ambush is usually organized covertly in places that make it difficult for the enemy to quickly deploy, maneuver, and escape from under fire. Here, an ambush, in my opinion, does not ensure the concealed location of the Tuaregs. They do not have good conditions for observation, firing, and, in extreme cases, if an ambush is discovered, planned escape routes. The success of this ambush is seen in the determination and endurance of the militants, but not in their skillful actions and accurate shooting. This is more like shooting the sleeping. If the Wagner reconnaissance discovered the ambush, it would be ineffective, or more precisely, useless, and could end in the loss of personnel and equipment of the rebels.
– There is, of course, the fact of surprise due to the covert advance to the ambush site. But the video does not show the correct organization of the rebel commanders' work on careful camouflage.
Every little detail is important here, since the smallest miscalculations can lead to the discovery of the ambush and result in the failure to complete the assigned task. It is not visible that the ambush unit is equipped with weapons to ensure the speed of the battle, the tactical and technical data of which would allow it to withstand a high rate of fire, as well as to hit the armored vehicles of the «Wagnerites», which determines the power of the ambush.
I do not observe its mobility, the ability to leave its combat position at any moment and go to a safe place along prepared escape routes. It is difficult to see the ambush of groups deployed in front of the front or on the flanks of a detachment of government forces that have made a halt on the march. And this is necessary to inflict maximum damage on them with sudden direct fire and dagger fire in combination with minefields, — the retired colonel said.
Meanwhile.
The other day, the daily government newspaper of Mali «Progress» (L'Essor) reported on its website that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Mali (Forces armées maliennes, FAMa) highly appreciated the dedication and great sense of duty of the government forces that participated in this major operation. «We express our endless gratitude to them. FAMa has taken this event fully and responsibly and is currently conducting a detailed analysis of the events in order to learn all the necessary lessons,” the newspaper quotes the General Staff’s statement as saying.