On the night of January 6, Russian airborne units began to land at the airfields of Almaty and Nur-Sultan, assigned by the orders of the Ministry of Defense to the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization). These are consolidated battalions of the 45th separate guards special-purpose brigade from Kubinka near Moscow, the 98th guards division from Ivanov and Kostroma and the 31st separate guards airborne assault brigade of the Airborne Forces from Ulyanovsk.
You need to understand what such formations never land in full force, and the number of servicemen taking up the protection of key infrastructure facilities in the largest cities of Kazakhstan is much less than their regular strength. The declared number of CSTO troops at 3,600 fighters is sufficient to protect the most important government facilities.
The main force of our Defense Ministry performing peacekeeping functions — a brigade from Samara — is involved today on a shift basis in an operation on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. But the troops allocated now have a similar experience. The soldiers from the 45th brigade not only took part in both Chechen campaigns: in the 90s they were peacekeepers in Transnistria, North Ossetia and Abkhazia. In very similar circumstances, after the riots that led to the change of power, the battalion of the brigade ensured the safety of Russian citizens in Kyrgyzstan in 2010.
Parts of the 98th division took part in the Chechen wars and the armed conflict with Georgia in 2008. In the summer of 2014, a dozen of her servicemen without insignia were detained on the territory of Ukraine (they were soon handed over to the Russian command). The Ulyanovsk brigade provided escort for humanitarian convoys in Sarajevo, participated in the second Chechen campaign and in the war with Georgia in 2008.
In addition to the standard BMD (airborne combat vehicles), the Russian troops in Kazakhstan are armed with Tiger armored vehicles, which are ideal for quick maneuvering around the city in conditions when the opposing detachments organized according to the guerrilla principle do not have serious weapons. They will protect from automatic and machine-gun bullets.
Departure of the main forces of the Russian CSTO peacekeepers to Kazakhstan. Photo: Russian Ministry of Defense/TASS
According to recent reports, the bandits may have support from some members of the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan, who have means of intercepting information on mobile networks. However, communication between CSTO units is maintained through army satellite channels and is absolutely inaccessible for eavesdropping either by bandits or by the government of Kazakhstan.
The Leer-3 electronic warfare systems unloaded from aircraft allow blocking any radio communication on the channels of coordination between the leaders armed resistance. The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, with the help of its press service, deliberately demonstrated them to everyone, having indicated their capabilities in advance. If support for the revolt in Kazakhstan really came from the very top, the organizers should think about it. After all, they all received military education in Russia.
The speed of organization and advancement, combat readiness and mobility of Russian units carrying out the CSTO order were assessed by our experts as impressive.